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Respondents Hercules, Inc. and Cigna Insurance Company 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Hercules") hereby file 
their response to Petitioner's Petition for Review on appeal to 
this Court from the Industrial Commission. The administrative 
law judge ("ALJ") allowed Petitioner's claim for Workers' 
Compensation benefits but the Industrial Commission of Utah (the 
"Commission") overturned the ALJ and denied Petitioner's claim 
for benefits. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the Petition for 
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-86 (1988), 
§ 35-1-82.53(2) (1988), § 63-46b-16 (1988), § 78-2a-3(2)(a) 
(1988) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Hercules submits that the issues on appeal and the 
Standards of Appellant Review are as follows: 
(1) Whether the Commission's finding that Petitioner's 
work activities did not cause or aggravate his shoulder injury is 
supported by substantial evidence. 
As medical causation is a factual issue, the proper 
standard of review of this question is the "substantial evidence" 
test. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 
(Utah App. 1989) .* The Commission found that Petitioner's 
shoulder injury was not medically caused by repetitive motion at 
work (R. at 87). Findings of fact must be affirmed if they are 
"supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the Court." Johnson v. Board of Review, 198 
Utah Adv. Rep. 67, 68 (Utah App. 1992), citing Stewart v. Board 
of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(4)(g) (1989)). "Substantial evidence is more 
than a scintilla of evidence but less than the weight of the 
evidence." Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68. 
(2) Petitioner claims that the Commission committed 
error by "comparing the Petitioner's non-job related activities 
to his job-related activities in application of the Allen 
causation test." However, this is not an issue in this case 
because the Commission did not apply the Allen legal causation 
test. The Commission denied Petitioner's claim based on a lack 
of proof of medical causation. Petitioner argues that the 
Commission improperly applied the unusual exertion test which 
pertains only to legal causation. The Commission did not reach 
the issue of legal causation, and so could not have misapplied 
the test. 
Petitioner consistently refers to the inappropriate 
standard of "arbitrary disregard of competent evidence in favor 
of unsubstantial contradictory evidence." Both the UAPA, §63-
46b-16, and the current case law make clear that the standard is 
as set forth above. 
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(3) Whether the Commission committed error through 
Commissioner Carlson's walk-through of Petitioner's job site.2 
As this is a question of law, the standard of appellate 
review is "correction of error," Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of 
Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following statutes are determinative in this 
appeal: Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-88 (1965) and 
§ 63-46b-8 (1988), 63-46b-12 (1988) and § 63-46b-16 (1988). The 
determinative statutes are set forth in full in Exhibit "A". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner seeks review of the Commission's Order 
overturning the order of the ALJ and denying his claim for 
Workers' Compensation benefits. The Commission denied 
Petitioner's claim for benefits because Petitioner did not prove 
that his work activities caused or aggravated his shoulder 
injury. 
Petitioner states that the third issue on appeal is 
"whether evidence required [sic] from a hearing at the job cite 
[sic] with only Defendants' representatives present and without 
giving adequate notice to the Petitioner and his attorney is 
violative of Petitioner's due process rights and renders such 
evidence inadmissible." This misstates the issue because 
(1) there was not a hearing at the job sitef (2) Petitioner was 
given adequate notice of the Commissioner's visit, and (3) there 
is nothing in the record to support the claim that any "evidence" 
from the walk-through was considered by a majority of the 
Commission in reaching its decision. 
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Petitioner filed his application for hearing on 
February 26, 1992, seeking recovery of permanent partial 
disability benefits. Petitioner claims that his shoulder was 
aggravated by repetitive motion at work at Hercules from 1984 
through 1990. Hercules submits that Petitioner's injury was 
caused solely by his frequent competitive and recreational 
Softball playing and therefore that he is not entitled to 
benefits. 
A hearing before an ALJ was held on September 2, 1992. 
(R. 171). The ALJ concluded that Petitioner's shoulder injury 
was aggravated by his work activity and she awarded temporary 
total compensation benefits. Petitioner did not submit a whole 
person impairment rating at that time. (R. 58) . Hercules filed 
a motion for review to the Commission on January 21# 1993. On 
April 2, 1993, the Commission granted Hercules' motion for review 
and denied Petitioner's claim for lack of proof of medical 
causation. (R. 88) . 
Statement of Facts 
Petitioner has a history of right shoulder pain dating 
back to 1986 or 1987. (R. 198) . In March of 1988, Petitioner 
went to see Dr. Lonnie Paulos about his shoulder pain. (R. 11). 
Dr. Paulos' medical records dated March 28, 1988 state that 
Petitioner was complaining of right shoulder pain "only with 
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throwing, especially from the out field." Dr. Paulos' records on 
that date also state that Petitioner had the shoulder pain for 
approximately two years prior to that visit. Dr. Paulos' 
impression on March 28, 1988 was "chronic impingement syndrome 
that may be [secondary] to silent subluxation or glenoid labral 
biceps evulsion injury." (R. 11). Finally, Dr. Paulos' 
March 28, 1988 records state that Petitioner occasionally 
experienced "popping" and "grating" in his shoulder "but has no 
symptoms or instability or pain with overhead activity. Pain is 
only with throwing." (R. 11). 
Petitioner visited Dr. Paulos' numerous times after the 
initial visit. On May 11, 1989 Dr. Paulos' records regarding 
Petitioner state "worse with playing softball, had improvement 
with injection." (R. 13). On February 15, 1990 Dr. Paulos' 
records state "the current patient diagnosis is right shoulder 
chronic impingement . . . increased pain, positive night pain." 
(R. 14). On October 25, 1990, Dr. Paulos' notes state "patient 
still doing poorly, wants scope subacromial debridement." 
(R. 16). None of the above medical records mention any 
connection to Petitioner's work activities. On November 14, 
1990, Dr. Paulos performed surgery on Petitioner's shoulder. (R. 
24). Petitioner continued to see Dr. Paulos after his surgery. 
On April 25, 1991 Dr. Paulos' notes state that Petitioner was 
"doing well" and "he wants to start long throws." (R. 21). 
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Dr. Paulos' medical records say nothing of any link 
between Petitioner's shoulder injury and his work activities 
until January 14, 1991, nearly three years after his first 
treatment with Dr. Paulos. (R. 4). On January 14, 1991, Dr. 
Paulos stated in a letter to "Whom It May Concern" that "Cory had 
damaged his shoulder through his occupational duties and various 
sports activities." (R. 4). 
Dr. Paulos' notes from Petitioner's first visit state 
that Petitioner played 200 plus softball games per year. 
(R. 11). Petitioner testified at the hearing before the ALJ that 
he played recreational and competitive softball but did not play 
200 games a year. (R. 229). Though Petitioner had been seeing 
Dr. Paulos since 1988, Dr. Paulos' medical records do not even 
hint that Petitioner's condition may be work related until the 
January 14, 1991 letter. Indeed, Petitioner stated at the 
hearing before the ALJ that he and Dr. Paulos did not discuss his 
work maneuvers in much detail. (R. 221). 
Petitioner claims he began feeling shoulder pain at 
work as early as 1986 or 1987, but did not notify Hercules until, 
at the very earliest, November of 1990. (R. 208). Petitioner 
testified that he reported his shoulder problems to the nurse at 
the Hercules clinic in November of 1990. The nurse asked if 
Petitioner wanted to file a Workers Compensation claim, but 
Petitioner decided not to do so at that time. (R. 208). 
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In addition to the January 14, 1991 letter, Dr. Paulos 
wrote two more letters regarding the cause of Petitioner's 
injury, one on September 1, 1992, the day before the hearing with 
the ALJ, and one on September 4, 1992, two days after the 
hearing. (R. 39-40). Dr. Paulos' September 1, 1922 letter 
states in part: 
I have thoroughly reviewed the above-
referenced patient's chart and find that his 
shoulder problem was mainly caused from 
sports activity. In fact, at the time of his 
first office visit to our clinic, he was 
specifically asked if this was a work-related 
problem and he responded in the negative. 
However, in thorough questioning we did find 
that the type of work he performed aggravated 
the shoulder as did the sports activity. It 
is possible that his work did thus aggravate 
the problem along with the sports activities 
but I feel safe in stating that it did not 
cause the problem originally. In fact, the 
patient stated to us that he had suffered a 
baseball injury two years before presenting 
to us which he felt was the inciting 
incident. 
(R. 39). Dr. Paulos' September 4 letter to Petitioner's attorney 
states in part flOur records reveal that the Patient presented to 
us with shoulder soreness when throwing in softball. After 
thorough questioning, we also found out that the patient's work 
functions aggravated the shoulder as well. . . . We cannot 
determine which was the worst of the aggravating problems -- both 
contributed equally." (R. 40). 
Despite Dr. Paulos' statements regarding "thorough 
questioning," the applicant made it clear at the hearing that he 
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had never discussed his work activities with Dr. Paulos in any 
depth, (R. 220, 233) . In contrast, he admitted that Dr. Richard 
E. Johns, Jr. observed him on the job and went over every single 
move the Petitioner made. (R. 196). Dr. Johns is the medical 
director at the Hercules clinic. His duties include helping 
employees with post injury rehabilitation. Dr. Johns talked with 
Petitioner about his Softball playing and performed an ergonomic 
evaluation to assess the risk that Petitioner would aggravate his 
shoulder if he returned to work. Dr. Johns' ergonomic tests 
included studying pictures of Petitioner's work tasks and 
personally watching Petitioner perform his work activities. 
(R. 228) . After talking with Petitioner and actually observing 
him work, Dr. Johns wrote: 
It would be my opinion that his intermittent 
upper extremity work as a machinist at 
Hercules would not have caused his right 
shoulder impingement syndrome. It appears 
more medically plausible that for his age, 
baseball and perhaps other intensive 
recreational activities are more likely to 
have caused his condition. 
(R. 168). 
The ALJ ruled in favor of Petitioner, relying on 
Dr. Paulos' letters rather than Dr. Johns' opinion. (R. 57). 
The Commission granted Hercules' motion for review and overturned 
the ALJ's ruling. (R. 87). The Commission concluded "based on 
the evidence of record . . . there is insufficient evidence to 
show that the work place caused or aggravated the shoulder injury 
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alleged . . . the shoulder injury alleged was pre-existing and 
was caused by Softball and other recreational activities." (R. 
87). The Commission found that Dr. Paulos' records regarding the 
medical cause of the injury were inconclusive. (R. 87). The 
Commission relied on Dr. Johns' report because Dr. Johns visited 
the work place and watched Petitioner work. (R. 87). The 
Commission also emphasized that Dr. Johns' letter of April 1# 
1992 specifically stated that Petitioner's "intermittent upper 
extremity work as a machinist at Hercules would not have caused 
his shoulder impingement syndrome." (R. 86). In addition, the 
Commission noted that Dr. Paulos' medical records did not connect 
Petitioner's injury to his work activities and did not even 
mention work activities until January of 1991. (R. 86). The 
Commission concluded that if Petitioner had experienced pain on 
the job, he would have reported it. (R. 87). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner seeks Workers' Compensation benefits based 
on an injury which was caused by his frequent Softball playing 
and is not related to his work activities. The Commission found 
that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving medical 
causation by a preponderance of the evidence. Petitioner relies 
on several letters from Dr. Lonnie Paulos to prove medical 
causation. However, Dr. Paulos' records are conflicting. 
Petitioner began seeing Dr. Paulos in 1988, but there is no 
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mention of Petitioner's work activities in Dr. Paulos' records 
until January of 1991. Dr. Paulos' statements of causation are 
inconclusive, inconsistent and do not amount to proof of medical 
causation. 
This Court should uphold the ruling of the Commission 
because it is supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the entire record. The Commission's role is to review 
factual evidence, such as evidence of medical causation, and make 
a determination based on the evidence. The Commission relied on 
Dr. Johns' opinion that Petitioner's injury was not caused or 
aggravated by his work activities. Dr. Johns concluded that 
Petitioner's injury was caused by frequent softball playing. The 
Commission found that Dr. Johns' opinion was credible because he 
visited the job site and watched and studied Petitioner's work 
motions. Dr. Johns' opinion alone is substantial evidence of no 
medical causation. Even if Dr. Paulos' statements regarding 
medical causation had been clear and consistent, the Commission's 
reliance on Dr. Johns' opinion is justified because it is 
substantial evidence and the Commission's duty is to resolve 
issues of fact. 
The Commission did not commit error in comparing 
Petitioner's non job-related activities to his job-related 
activities in applying the Allen legal causation test, because it 
did not apply the Allen test. The Commission found that 
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Petitioner did not prove medical causation. The Commission based 
this on the lack of proof of medical causation provided by 
Petitioner and the affirmative proof of no medical causation 
provided by Dr. Johns. The Commission did not compare 
Petitioner's employment activities to his nonemployment 
activities for the purpose of determining whether there was an 
unusual exertion. It made the comparison to illustrate that 
Petitioner's out-of-work activities were unusual and therefore 
supported the finding that Petitioner's out-of-work activities 
were the medical cause of his shoulder injury. The Commission 
did not reach the question of legal causation because it found 
that Petitioner did not prove medical causation and therefore, 
the Commission could not have misapplied the Allen test. 
Commissioner Carlson's visit to Petitioner's work place 
did not violate Petitioner's due process rights. A majority of 
the Commission had decided to deny benefits prior to Commissioner 
Carlson's visit. Even if this Court excludes any evidence 
gathered from the visit, the Commission's ruling would be the 
same. Moreover, Commissioner Carlson's visit to the work place 
did not violate Petitioner's due process rights because it was 
not a hearing. As a Commissioner, Commissioner Carlson has a 
statutory right and obligation to investigate a claim and 
investigations are not necessarily hearings. Finally, 
Petitioner's counsel was given adequate notice of the walk-
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through and when Petitioner or his counsel did not show, 
Hercules' counsel did not participate in the walk-through. The 
Commission did not hold a hearing; it conducted an investigation 
of which all parties were given notice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR REVIEW SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE 
HIS INJURY WAS CAUSED BY FREQUENT SOFTBALL PLAYING AND THE 
COMMISSION'S FINDING OF NO MEDICAL CAUSATION IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
A. Petitioner Failed to Meet His Burden of Proving Medical 
Causation. 
In order to receive Workers' Compensation benefits, 
Petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
shoulder injury was caused by an industrial accident. Large v. 
Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah App. 1988). "The 
medical causation requirement will prevent an employer from 
becoming a general insurer of his employees and discourage 
fraudulent claims." Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15, 
27 (Utah App. 1986). In order to prove medical causation, 
Petitioner must provide conclusive evidence of a connection 
between his shoulder injury and his work activities. Lancaster 
v. Gilbert Development. 736 P.2d 237, 240 (Utah 1987). 
Lancaster is very similar to this case. In Lancaster, 
the petitioner argued that his work activities at high altitude 
and in cold weather caused his heart attack. The petitioner's 
personal physician opined that his work activities contributed to 
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his injury. Petitioner's physician testified that the working 
conditions "probably" precipitated the heart attack. Id. at 239. 
The ALJ sent the case to a medical panel and the medical panel 
doctor stated ". . .while it is possible the cold exposure and 
his exertion had a role in precipitating the myocardial 
infarction, . . . it is unlikely they played a significant role." 
Id. at 240. The Lancaster Court held: 
[n]ot one of the doctors was willing to state 
with medical certainty that the claimant's 
injury was caused by work-related factors. 
Thus, there is competent and comprehensive 
medical evidence in the record upon which the 
Administrative Law Judge could rely in 
concluding that medical causation was 
lacking. 
Though the Lancaster Court applied the old standard of appellate 
review and not the "substantial evidence test," it still stands 
for the proposition that the applicant must provide conclusive 
proof of medical causation. Id. at 240. 
In this case, Petitioner has also failed to meet his 
burden of proof. The Commission found that Petitioner's shoulder 
condition was not caused or aggravated by repetitive motion at 
work (R. 87). In making that determination the Commission 
concluded that Dr. Paulos' letters addressing medical causation 
were inconclusive and insufficient to meet the burden of proof. 
(R. 86-87). 
Dr. Paulos wrote three letters regarding medical 
causation, but his opinion on the subject is unclear. Dr. 
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Paulos' January 14, 1991 letter says, "Cory has damaged his 
shoulder through his occupational duties and various sports 
activities." (R. 4). Dr. Paulos' September 1, 1992 letter 
states that his shoulder problem was mainly caused from sports 
activities, but in the same letter Dr. Paulos states, "However, 
in thorough questioning we did find that the type of work he 
performed aggravated the shoulder as did the sports activity. It 
is possible that his work did thus aggravate the problem along 
with the sports activities but I feel safe in saying that it did 
not cause the problem originally." (R. 39). (Emphasis added.) 
Finally, on September 4, 1992 Dr. Paulos sent another letter to 
Petitioner's counsel. In that letter Dr. Paulos stated in part, 
"After thorough questioning we also found out that the patient's 
work functions aggravated the shoulder as well. We cannot 
determine which was the worst of the aggravating problems -- both 
contributed equally." (R. 40). (Emphasis in original.) 
The Petitioner had been seeing Dr. Paulos for about 
three years but the January 14, 1991 letter is the first time 
that Dr. Paulos even hints that Petitioner's injury may have been 
aggravated at work. Petitioner and Dr. Paulos did not even 
discuss Petitioner's work activities in much detail. (R. 221, 
233). Indeed, Dr. Paulos states in his September 1, 1992 letter 
that, "The patient stated to us that he had suffered a baseball 
-14-
injury two years before presenting to us which he felt was the 
inciting incident." (R. 4), 
Dr. Paulos' records regarding medical causation are 
inconclusive at best. They certainly do not rise to the level of 
"medical certainty" or "conclusive evidence." Dr. Paulos' 
records do not prove medical causation by a preponderance of the 
evidence, nor do they prove that Petitioner's work activities 
amounted to a permanent, ratable aggravation of his Softball 
injury. In Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah 
App. 1990), this Court held that an aggravation of a preexisting 
condition is not compensable if it is a temporary aggravation or 
a nonratable acceleration of symptoms. Id. Only a permanent, 
ratable aggravation of a preexisting condition is compensable. 
Id. 
In Virgin, the petitioner sought workers' compensation 
benefits for a hip replacement claiming that his hip condition 
was aggravated by an industrial accident. The ALJ appointed a 
medical panel of one orthopedic surgeon who stated, "I think 
perhaps it happened sooner than it would have had he not had an 
injury, but I feel he would have ultimately needed surgery on 
this in spite of any industrial injury..." The doctor was unable 
to assign a degree of permanent or temporary impairment due to 
the accident. Id. at 1286. Based on the doctor's statement the 
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ALJ found that the industrial accident was causally connected to 
the hip replacement. 
In Virgin, as in this case, the Commission reviewed the 
case and overturned the ALJ's Order and findings. On review to 
this Court, the petitioner in Virgin argued that, because the 
medical panel found that the industrial accident aggravated his 
preexisting condition, his hip replacement was compensable. Id. 
at 1287. This Court stated that the Commission, not the ALJ, is 
the ultimate finder of fact and may choose to give certain 
evidence more weight than other evidence. This Court held that 
there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's 
finding of no medical causation. 2d. at 1290. 
In this case, there is no conclusive evidence that 
Petitioner's work activities contributed to or permanently 
aggravated his preexisting softball injury. Therefore, 
Petitioner has not provided proof of medical causation and that 
alone is substantial evidence to support the Commission's 
decision. More significantly, there is conclusive evidence from 
Dr. Johns that Petitioner's softball activities, not his work 
activities, injured his shoulder. 
B. The Commission's Finding of no Medical Causation is 
Supported by Substantial Evidence. 
The Commission's role is to resolve factual disputes 
and in this case the Commission found that Petitioner's work 
activities did not cause or aggravate his shoulder injury. It is 
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not error for the Commission to choose one medical opinion over 
another or to rely on certain facts and discount others. "It is 
the province of the Board not the Appellate Courts, to resolve 
conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be 
drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the 
inferences." Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68, citing Board of 
Educ. of Montgomery County v. Paynter. 303 Md. 22, 491 A.2d 1186, 
1193 (1985). Dr. Johns' opinion was that Petitioner's injury was 
not caused by work but, most likely, by recreational activities. 
(R. 168). After reviewing the evidence, the Commission found 
that Dr. Paulos' statements regarding causation were inconclusive 
and it relied on Dr. Johns' opinion in making its determination. 
In Olsen v. Industrial Commission, 797 P.2d 1098 (Utah 
1990), the Supreme Court of Utah held that when confronted with 
conflicting evidence of medical causation the ALJ and/or the 
Commission is to decide which evidence is more credible under the 
circumstances. The Olsen Court upheld the ALJ and the Commission 
stating that the ALJ articulated sound reasons for choosing one 
medical opinion over another. Id. at 1100. 
In this case, the Commission relied on Dr. Johns' 
opinion because it was conclusive and because he personally 
performed ergonomic tests. Dr. Johns had first-hand knowledge of 
the information needed to determine the causation issue. 
Dr. Johns went to the job site, observed Petitioner doing his 
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job, took photographs and studied Petitioner's movements. 
Indeed, the Petitioner himself testified at the hearing that 
Dr. Johns went over every single move and took pictures. 
(R. 196). In addition, Dr. Johns interviewed Petitioner 
regarding his Softball activities. (R. 168) . Dr. Johns 
determined from reviewing the medical records and observing and 
studying Petitioner at work that his work activities did not 
cause his shoulder condition. (R. 168) . In contrast, Dr. Paulos 
never witnessed Petitioner's work motions and he and Petitioner 
never discussed Petitioner's job activities in depth. (R. 221, 
233). 
On page 22 of Petitioner's Brief, Petitioner attempts 
to undermine the credibility of Dr. Johns' opinion. However, the 
Commission found Dr. Johns' opinion credible and therefore this 
Court "should inquire only whether the findings are arbitrary and 
capricious." Olsen. 797 P.2d at 1100. 
Petitioner argues that Dr. Johns' testing was done to 
determine whether or not his job activities would pose a risk of 
reinjury in the future and that Dr. Johns found that Petitioner's 
activities as a machinist would pose a risk of reinjury. 
However, this was after Petitioner had been injured playing 
Softball and after he had shoulder surgery. It is no basis to 
infer that the activities could have caused the prior problems, 
especially in the face of the contrary, express conclusion 
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Dr. Johns reached. Petitioner also argues that Dr. Johns did not 
physically examine Petitioner. This is irrelevant, because Dr. 
Johns did not doubt the diagnosis, but was trying to determine 
the cause of the problems. To do that he interviewed Petitioner 
and went to the job site and saw what Petitioner did on a daily 
basis. This gives Dr. Johns more relevant facts for rendering an 
opinion than Dr. Paulos had because he was able to see and study 
Petitioner's job motions. Finally, Petitioner argues that 
Dr. Johns may be biased because he is employed by Hercules. This 
is no basis to discount the opinion of an experienced, credible 
physician. Respondents could also argue that as Dr. Paulos has 
been seeing Petitioner for almost five years, he may also be 
biased. Neither argument carries much weight. The reality is 
probably that neither Dr. Johns nor Dr. Paulos is biased but each 
is simply attempting to give a medical opinion to the best of 
their ability. 
Dr. Johns' opinion is substantial evidence of no 
medical causation. Even if we were to assume that Dr. Paulos 
concluded that Petitioner's injury was permanently aggravated by 
his work activities, the Commission could justifiably choose to 
rely on Dr. Johns' conclusion. 
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II. THE COMMISSION DID NOT REACH THE ISSUE OF LEGAL CAUSATION, 
SO PETITIONER'S SECOND POINT IS INAPPLICABLE. 
In Allen, 729 P.2d at 25, the Supreme Court of Utah 
adopted a two part test for analyzing causation. The Court 
stated that an applicant must prove medical causation and, if the 
applicant has a pre-existing condition, he must prove legal 
causation. With regard to legal causation the Allen Court 
stated, "To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with 
a pre-existing condition must show that the employment 
contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already 
faced in everyday life because of his condition." Id. at 25. 
With regard to medical causation the Allen Court stated, "Under 
the medical cause test, the claimant must show by evidence, 
opinion or otherwise that the stress, strain or exertion required 
by his or her occupation led to the resulting injury or 
disability. In the event the claimant cannot show a medical 
causal connection, compensation should be denied." Id. at 27. 
In this case, the Commission denied Petitioner's claim 
based on the lack of proof of medical causation. The Commission 
stated, "We conclude after reviewing the entire file that the 
applicant's shoulder problem was caused by his intensive softball 
activities, and that there is no credible evidence that his work 
place activities contributed in any degree to his shoulder 
injury." (R. 86.) The Commission did not reach the issue of 
legal causation. 
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Petitioner argues that the Commission held him to a 
higher standard in proving causation because of his unusual 
nonemployment activities. Petitioner stated, "The Industrial 
Commission is stating that because the Petitioner was playing 
competitive and recreational softball that his non-industrial 
activities involved unusual exertion and thus, somehow would 
raise the 'unusual exertion' in the work place standard under 
Allen to a higher level." (Petitioner's Brief p 25.) This 
argument misses the point because the unusual exertion standard 
is involved only in legal causation analysis, not medical 
causation analysis and, as indicated in Commission's Order, 
Petitioner's claim was denied on medical causation grounds. It 
is irrelevant whether Petitioner's work constituted an unusual 
exertion because, even if his exertion was unusual, it did not 
cause his shoulder injury. The Commission does make reference to 
Petitioner's extensive softball playing, but only as additional 
evidence that Petitioner's softball playing, not his work 
activities, was the medical cause of his shoulder injury. 
(R. 86-87). 
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III. THE COMMISSIONER DID NOT VIOLATE PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE 
PROCESS BY VISITING THE JOB SITE. 
A, The Visit Did Not Affect the Commission's Order and is, 
at Most, Harmless Error, 
On August 17, 1993, Commissioner Thomas R. Carlson 
visited the Hercules plant lfin order to view the machine operated 
by the applicant." (R. 87). None of the other Commissioners 
participated in this walk-through. (R. 87). Petitioner's 
counsel was invited to attend the walk-through but did not do so. 
Because Petitioner's counsel did not appear for the walk-through 
Hercules' counsel also did not participate. (R. 87) . 
The two Commissioners who did not participate in the 
walk-through, a majority of the Commission, had decided, before 
the walk-through, to grant the Hercules motion for review for 
lack of proof of medical causation.3 Therefore, the visit was, 
at most, harmless error. In Morton International v. Auditincr 
Division. 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991), the Supreme Court stated 
that the language in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (4), which deals 
with appellate courts' standard of review of formal adjudication 
proceedings, "is similar to language in the rules of procedure 
and evidence dealing with harmless error." Id. The Court 
3See the affidavit of the then-counsel for the Industrial 
Commission, Benjamin A. Sims at 1 7 (attached as Exhibit "B"). 
Mr. Sims assisted in finalizing the Commission's order before the 
visit took place, and the other two Commissioners who did not 
visit the job site "never wavered" in their decision to reverse 
the ALJ. 
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concluded, therefore, that the legislature intended that the 
harmless error standard used in appeals from judicial proceedings 
should also be applied in appeals from agency proceedings. Id. 
Therefore, error is harmless if it is "sufficiently 
inconsequential that . . . there is no reasonable likelihood that 
the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Id. citing 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
In this case, it is clear that the walk-through had no 
effect on the Commission's determination. Two of the three 
Commissioners did not participate in the walk-through and had 
decided to grant the motion for Review before the walk-through. 
Affidavit of Benjamin A. Sims at ^ 7 attached as Exhibit "B". 
Even if any "evidence" gathered by Commissioner Carlson from the 
walk-through is excluded or his vote is ignored altogether, the 
outcome is the same. With or without the walk-through, a 
majority of the Commission found, based on Dr. John's opinion and 
the other evidence in the record, that Petitioner's job was not 
the cause of his injury. Because the alleged error was harmless, 
the Order must be upheld. 
B. The Commission Did Not Hold a Hearing at the Job Site. 
Petitioner argues that Commissioner Carlson's walk-
through was a formal adjudicative proceeding and that Petitioner 
was given insufficient notice and therefore denied due process. 
Petitioner cites U.C.A. § 63-46b-8 for the proposition that he 
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should have been given the opportunity to present his point of 
view during the walk-through. However, § 63-46b-8 pertains only 
to hearings in formal adjudicative proceedings, and there is no 
basis to conclude that it applies to one Commissioner's 
independent investigation of the case. Indeed, the Commission's 
review of the ALJ's decision is governed by U.C.A. § 63-46b-12 
(1988), not § 63-46b-8. There is nothing in § 12 which precludes 
an investigation. In contrast, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (1965) 
expressly gives the Commission power to investigate. It states 
"[t]he Commission may make its investigation in such manner as in 
its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial 
rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the 
Workers' Compensation Act." U.C.A. § 35-1-88 does not require 
that any or all parties must be present when the Commission 
conducts its investigation. Therefore, there is no due process 
violation, because the statute Petitioner relies upon was not 
violated. 
C. Petitioner Was Given Adequate Notice of and Was Invited 
to Attend the Visit to the Job Site. 
Even though it was not a hearing, Commissioner Carlson 
invited the parties to attend the walk-through. (R. 77-81). 
Sims Affidavit at U 3. Petitioner claims that he was not given 
timely notice of Commissioner Carlson's walk-through. The record 
shows otherwise. Benjamin A. Sims, who was general counsel for 
the Industrial Commission at the time, notified Petitioner on 
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March 8, 1993 by telephone that the walk-through was planned for 
March 17. Sims Affidavit at 5 3. Petitioner's attorney did not 
say at that time that he could not attend nor did he object to 
the walk-through. Sims Affidavit at 5 4. Also, on March 10, 
1993 Petitioner's attorney was notified by telephone of the 
confirmed date and time of the walk-through. Sims Affidavit at 
5 5. Finally, on March 15, 1993, Petitioner's attorney was sent 
a letter and a fax notifying him of the walk-through. Sims 
Affidavit at 5 6.)4 (R. 77, 80-81). Petitioner's counsel never 
objected to the walk-through until after it happened, and both 
parties to this action received the same amount of notice. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Hercules respectfully 
requests that this Court deny Petitioner's Petition for Review 
and affirm the Order of the Industrial Commission. The April 2, 
1993, Order of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed 
because Petitioner did not prove medical causation. Dr. Johns' 
opinion that Petitioner's softball activities and not his work 
activities caused his shoulder injury is substantial evidence to 
support the Commission's finding of no medical causation. 
Petitioner's version of the events is inconsistent with the 
record. He claims his counsel did not receive written notice of 
the walk-through until the afternoon of March 16th. (R. 82). 
The Commission's records show that he received the fax on the 
morning of March 15 (R. 77, 80-81), and a phone call on March 
10th. (R. 77). Additionally, he first learned of it on March 
8th, nine days in advance. Sims Affidavit at 55 3 and 4. 
-25-
Commissioner Carlson did not commit error in visiting the job 
site but, in any event, the Commissioner's walk-through had 
absolutely no effect on the Commission's decision, and gives rise 
to no basis for reversal. 
DATED this -> day of August, 1993, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Steven Aeschbacher 
George S. Adondakis 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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35-1-88- Rules of evidence and procedure be-
fore commission and hearing examiner 
— Admissible evidence. 
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner 
shall be bound by the usual common-law or statutory 
rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules 
of procedure, other than as herein provided or as 
adopted by the commission pursuant to this act. The 
commission may make its investigation in such man-
ireT~H5"iTr1tglu5gment is best gTcuTate&Jg ascertain 
the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out 
justly the spirit ot the Workmen'j^Compensation Act. 
The commission may receive as evidence and use as 
proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed mate-
rial and relevant including, but not limited to the 
following: 
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented 
in open hearings. * 
(b) Reports of attending or examining physi-
cians, or of pathologists. 
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the 
commission. 
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of 
time sheets, book accounts or other records. 
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or 
diseased employee. 1965 
Exhibi t "A1 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of 
law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic-
tion conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro-
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed 
to follow prescribed procedure; 
(0 the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi-
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior prac-
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis-
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 1988 
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63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
(1) (a) Ifa statute or the agency's rules permit par-
ties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review 
of an order by the agency or by a superior agency, 
the aggrieved party may file a written request 
for review within 30 days after the issuance of 
the order with the person or entity designated for 
that purpose by the statute or rule. 
<b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the 
relief requested; 
(iii) state the date upon which it was 
mailed; and 
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer 
and to each party. 
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the re-
quest for review, or within the time period provided 
by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may 
file a response with the person designated by statute 
or rule to receive the response. One copy of the re-
sponse shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and 
to the presiding officer. 
(3) Ifa statute or the agency's rules require review 
of an order by the agency or a superior agency, the 
agency or superior agency shall review the order 
within a reasonable time or within the time required 
by statute or the agency's rules. 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior 
agency may by order or rule permit the parties to file 
briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument. 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to 
all parties. 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of 
any response, other filings, or oral argument, or 
within the time required by statute or applicable 
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a 
written order on review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the 
agency head or by a person designated by the 
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to 
each party. 
(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule per-
mitting or requiring review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues 
reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the 
issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding 
officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed, 
or modified, and whether all or any portion 
of the adjudicative proceeding is to be re-
manded; 
(vii) a notice of any right of further ad-
ministrative reconsideration or judicial re-
view available to aggrieved parties; and 
Cviii) the time limits applicable to any ap-
peal or review. 1988 
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63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Hearing procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections^63-46b-3(d)([) 
and (ii), in all formal adjudicative proceedings, a 
hearing shall be conducted as follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the 
course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of 
relevant facts and to afford all the parties reason-
able opportunity to present their positions. 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a 
party, the presiding officer: 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrele-
vant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious; 
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in 
the courts of Utah; 
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in 
the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or 
excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the 
original document; 
(iv) may take official notice of any facts 
that could be judicially noticed under the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of 
other proceedings before the agency, and of 
technical or scientific facts within the 
agency's specialized knowledge. 
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evi-
dence solely because it is hearsay. 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all par-
ties the opportunity to present evidence, argue, 
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit 
rebuttal evidence. 
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not 
a party to the adjudicative proceeding the oppor-
tunity to present oral or written statements at 
the hearing. 
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if 
offered as evidence to be considered in reaching a 
decision on the merits, shall be given under oath. 
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the 
agency's expense. 
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a 
person approved by the agency prepare a tran-
script of the hearing, subject to any restrictions 
that the agency is permitted by statute to impose 
to protect confidential information disclosed at 
the hearing, 
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding of-
ficer from taking appropriate measures necessary to 
preserve the integrity of the hearing. 1988 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 E. 300 S., THIRD FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600 
Telephone: (801) 53 0-6953 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CORY CHASE, * 
Petitioner, * AFFIDAVIT OF 
* BENJAMIN A, SIMS 
v. * 
* 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF * 
UTAH, HERCULES, INC., * 
and CIGNA, * Appeal No. 930271-CA 
* 
Respondents. * 
A F F I D A V I T 
I, Benjamin A. Sims, do hereby swear that the following is 
true to be best of my recollection, based upon my personal 
knowledge of the events herein. At the time of the events recited 
in this affidavit I was the general counsel of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah. I provide these comments in connection with 
the case Chase v. Ind. Comm/n et al.. Case No. 930271-CA which has 
been filed with the Utah Court of Appeals 
1. On or about March 7, 1993, I was called into Commissioner 
Carlson's office to discuss the motion for review and the facts of 
the Cory Chase case. Commissioners' Hadley and Colton were also 
present. The Commissioners had individually reviewed the Chase 
file, and Commissioner Carlson was unsure whether to uphold the 
administrative law judge (who had ruled in favor of Chase) or to 
determine that the alleged injury was not industrially related. 
2. Commissioner Carlson determined after discussion that he 
desired to view the machine which Chase claimed had caused his 
injury. The other two Commissioners determined that they did not 
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want to attend because they believed that the evidence showed that 
the alleged injury was not industrially related. Commissioner 
Carlson then checked his calendar and determined that he could view 
the machine on March 17, 1993 when he returned from an out-of-town 
trip. 
3. It is my recollection that shortly thereafter I called 
Steve Aeschbacher, counsel for Hercules on March 8, 1993 to set up 
the visit for the afternoon of March 17, 1993. I then called Wayne 
Freestone on the same date, and informed him that at least one of 
the Commissioners would visit Hercules on March 17, 1993 for a site 
viewing, and that he and his client should be on notice. 
4. Mr. Freestone informed me that he would be at the prison on 
that date, and that he would prefer the visit to be on another date 
or as late as possible. I asked him if this date would be 
impossible or merely a problem, and he replied that it would not be 
impossible and that he might have to leave the prison early in 
order to be there. After reviewing Commissioner Carlson's 
calendar, it was decided that this was the best date to have the 
visit, and so the visit was left on the calendar at 2:00 p.m. on 
March 17, 1993 since the Commissioner did not want to get involved 
in a shift change which would occur at 4:00 p.m. 
5. Mr. Freestone was again informed on March 10, 1993 by 
telephone of the confirmed date and time. No mention was made by 
Mr. Freestone that either he or his client could not attend. 
6. On March 15, 1993, both a letter and a fax were sent to Mr. 
Freestone in order for him to be admitted to Hercules, and again 
informing him of the date and time of the visit to Hercules. The 
first notice the Commission received that Mr. Freestone or his 
client would not attend was delivered to the Commission on March 
17, 1993. 
7. Commissioner Carlson went to Hercules alone, and no other 
Commission personnel, or Commissioners were in attendance. 
Commissioners Hadley and Colton had told me from the very beginning 
that they did not desire to go, although I did notify the parties 
that they might attend, and I assisted these two Commissioners from 
the time of the first meeting in finalizing the order of the 
Commissioners which is reflected in the order of April 2, 1993. 
There were no meetings with all three Commissioners subsequent to 
the March 7, 1993 meeting to discuss this case, and Commissioners' 
Hadley and Colton never wavered in their view that the evidence 
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showed that Mr. Chase's injury was not industrially related. 
DATED THIS ,^-G Day of August 1993. 7 
-BENJ. 
/ 
( 
CERTIFICATE OF FILING 
I hereby certify that the original of the foregoing 
Affidavit of Benjamin A. Sims was hand delivered±>y me personally 
to the Utah Court of Appeals this <2&j£ day of cn^£LJ^<^f , 
1993. — 7 7 -
Sharon J. Eblen 
Associate General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the £-*hr/\ day of 6^'a^<^7 . 
1993, I mailed an accurate photocopy of the foregoing Afffdavit of 
Benjamin A. Sims to the following: 
Steven J. Aeschbacher 
George S. Adondakis 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 S. MAIN ST. 
P.O. BOX 45385 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-0385 
WAYNE A. FREESTONE 
50 WEST 300 SOUTH, SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
Sharon J . Eb 
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